



At the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held
in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, countries reached a consensus that
environmental protection and economic development must be partners to
achieve the common goal of environmentally sustainable development.'
Economic competitiveness must take place within the framework dictated by
this common goal.2 Sustainable development implies that future generations
have as much right as the present generation to a robust environment with
which to meet their own needs and preferences. Elsewhere I have argued that
we hold the environment in common with all generations-past, present, and
future.3 As members of the present generation, we are both trustees of the
environment with obligations to care for it for future generations, and
beneficiaries entitled to use it for our own economic and social well-being. In
brief, each generation has both rights and obligations in relation to the
environment.
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author thanks Charles Weiss, Jr. and
Peter Lallas, Esq. for their review of a draft, Mark Kindall, Esq. for his contribution to the Section on
transferable permits, and Pamela Cothran for her research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Overview ofAgenda 21 and Implementation Mechanisms: Report of the Secretary-General
of the Conference, U.N. GAOR Preparatory Comm. for U.N. Conference on Environment and Development,
4th Plen. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/PC/100/Add.l (1992) [hereinafter Agenda Item 21]; THE WORLD
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) [hereinafter OUR
COMMON FUTURE]. The Rio Conference celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the 1972 Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment, in which the key issue was whether environmental protection and
economic development were consistent.
2. In contrast to sustainable development in which all countries maintain environmental robustness and
gain economic wealth, competitiveness among countries necessarily produces relative winners and relative
losers in the race for economic wealth.
3. See, e.g., EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989); Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and
Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 190 (1990); Edith Brown
Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity, I I ECOL. L.Q. 495 (1984). There
are two relationships which shape a theory of intergenerational equity: our relationship to the natural system
and our relationship to other generations of our species. With regard to the first, we are an integral part of
the natural system. As the most sentient of living creatures, we have a special responsibility to care for the
natural system and to maintain its integrity and robustness, which accompanies our inherent right to use
it. As to the second relationship, we are in partnership with all generations in our relation to the natural
system. Because there is no basis for preferring one generation over another, environmental assets must be
conserved so that they are equally available to those who come after us.
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The notion that future generations have rights to inherit a robust
environment provides a solid normative underpinning for the idea of
environmentally sustainable development.4 In its absence, sustainable
development might depend entirely on a sense of noblesse oblige of the present
generation. Intergenerational rights require environmentally sustainable
development by the present generation.
Environmental regulation must therefore be viewed from a long-term
perspective. The same is true of competitiveness, since nations and firms may
be tempted to pay a heavy price in environmental degradation in order to
compete for economic gain. For this reason, competitiveness among countries
is not simply a short-term economic issue, but rather an intergenerational one.5
Future generations may have to pay more for the same goods and services that
we receive today because of the increasing funds that must be allocated to
cover interest on the national debt. Similarly, if a country degrades its
environment or otherwise fails to maintain environmental robustness, it may
impose large remedial costs on future generations which will divert resources
from other investments and activities. Moreover, contemporary environmental
degradation may reduce the natural resource options available to future
generations to satisfy their demands, such as by limiting the uses of lakes,
rivers and forests. In these ways, today's environmental damage may affect
tomorrow's competitiveness. 7
Sustainable competitiveness, which combines the interests that underlie
sustainable development and international competitiveness, puts environmental
protection and methods that facilitate economic growth under a common
umbrella. If nations adopt sustainable competitiveness as the appropriate
context for considering the relation between environmental regulations and
competitiveness, several important points in response to Professor Stewart's
article emerge.
First, sustainable competitiveness means that environmental protection is
not an amenity, or luxury good,8 to be indulged in after a country has
4. For further analysis of this issue, see Jerome Rothenberg, Economic Perspectives on Time
Comparisons: An Evaluation of Tne Discounting, in GLOBAL ACCORD 307 (Nazli Choucri ed.,
forthcoming 1993) and Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity: Toward an International Legal
Framework, in id. at 333.
5. Robert Reich has defined American competitiveness as "the capacity of Americans to add value to
the world economy and thereby gain a higher standard of living in the future without going into ever deeper
debt." Robert B. Reich, Who is Us?, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 53, 59. For a concise analysis
of national competitiveness, see Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, HARV. Bus.
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 73, 84-85.
6. See U.S. Budget for Fiscal Year 1993, pt. 3, ch. 26, at 1, 12-13 (on file with author). See generally
LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING: KNOWING WHO PAYS, AND WHEN, FOR WHAT
WE SPEND (1992). The new method of generational accounting is used to compare the fiscal treatment of
different generations.
7. See ALBERT GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 194 (1992) (stating that healthy environment is type
of infrastructure supporting future productivity).
8. Richard Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039,
2052-53.
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achieved a given level of economic development. Nor is the environment
appropriately viewed only in the context of comparative assimilative capacity.9
Rather, sustainable competitiveness limits the extent to which we can treat
environmental conditions as a factor of comparative advantage or as a luxury
good. Certain kinds of environmental protection must accompany economic
development if competitiveness is to be environmentally sustainable.' 0
Actions in pursuit of competitiveness today must be conceived so that we do
not borrow from our children and our grandchildren a debt we cannot repay.
Second, Professor Stewart recommends "international harmonization" of
standards through international agreements to address transboundary
externalities" but is skeptical about harmonizing other national environmental
standards, largely because of different environmental assimilative capacities
among countries. In certain circumstances, however, it is important to develop
internationally agreed-upon minimum standards among countries for measures
that affect environmentally sustainable development, and these should then
serve as a basis for competitive behavior among firms. This applies to
transboundary environmental impacts, including those affecting the global
commons, as noted by Stewart, but in addition to certain environmental
impacts within national borders. At the level of the firm, sustainable
competitiveness means concern for the whole life cycle of the production
process and the internalization of the full costs of production, as expressed in
the polluter pays principle.
Third, as Stewart argues, market-based incentives are promising
environmental policy instruments, but, as Stewart does not discuss, they are
largely untested. It is important to ensure that such instruments be designed to
support the goal of environmentally sustainable development, that the interests
of future generations be considered, and that experience with them be carefully
monitored and evaluated.
This Comment explores each of these three issues in turn.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AS CENTRAL TO COMPETITIVENESS
The chief obstacle to considering competitiveness and environmental
regulation in the intergenerational context is the view raised by Professor
Stewart that the environment is an amenity-a luxury for which there is
significant demand only when basic needs have been satisfied, and hence an
economic good which can be traded off against other economic goods.'
2
Lawrence Summers, former chief economist of the World Bank, outlined this
9. See id. at 2052-53, 2056-61.
10. See infra Part II.
11. Stewart, supra note 8, at 2097-2102.
12. Id. at 2052-53, 2056, 2057-60.
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view in his memorandum circulated in the World Bank) 3 From this
perspective, it is more efficient for some countries to host dirty industries than
for others, a factor which Stewart refers to as comparative assimilative
capacity.' 4 Stewart implicitly endorses this viewpoint. 5 Under this view,
industries should migrate to areas with clean air, water, or soils, or with the
least stringent environmental regulations. The Summers memo provocatively
explored the economic rationale for the migration of "dirty" industries to
developing countries. 6
One can legitimately argue that a country today should be able to develop
in ways that may not be the most environmentally sound provided that the
damage can be repaired at acceptable costs later. While people would pay the
costs of environmental degradation now, they would in theory generate the
wealth to be able to repair it later. Crucial to this argument is the assumption
that environmental damage is not permanent: that it can always be repaired
later, presumably by investing the fruits of the economic growth achieved by
accepting a temporary burden of pollution. Some economic studies have
suggested that the empirical relationship between environment and
development is an inverted U-shaped curve, in which countries pollute the
environment up to the point at which they have become sufficiently
industrialized that they can indulge their concern for protecting the
environment.17
Some long-term environmental damage, however, cannot be repaired over
a period of one or even a few generations. Ozone depletion, loss of biological
diversity, contamination of soils by hazardous, toxic or nuclear wastes, and
pollution of lake bottoms and ground water aquifers are either irreversible or
reversible at unacceptably high costs.'" Moreover, they affect the robustness of
our ecosystems and the integrity of our global environment and create a drag
on future economic competitiveness. Actions today that irreversibly degrade
the environment, or impose such high remedial costs that degradation is
13. Let Them Eat Pollution, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992, at 66 (reproducing text of memo) [hereinafter
Let Them Eat]. According to Summers, "the demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health
reasons is likely to have very high income-elasticity."
14. Stewart, supra note 8, at 2056.
15. Id. at 2057-60.
16. The memo referred to three theoretical reasons for dirty industries to migrate to developing
countries: 1) pollution which impairs health should be done in the country which faces the lowest cost from
health-impairing pollution, which will be the country with the lowest wages: "the economic logic behind
dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable .... ; 2) Initial increments of
pollution have low cost and "under-populated countries in Africa are vastly under-polluted; their air quality
is probably vastly inefficiently low [sic] compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City;" and 3) "[t]he demand
for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is likely to have very high income-elasticity." Let
Them Eat, supra note 13.
17. See, e.g., Robert E.B. Lucas et al., Economic Development, Environmental Regulation and the
International Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollution: 1960-88, 159 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS:
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 67, 72 (Patrick Low ed., 1992) [hereinafter WORLD BANK
PAPERS].
18. See generally OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 1, at 3-8.
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effectively irreversible, burden future generations in that they will have fewer
resources to meet increasing demands. No country should have the right to
degrade the environment irreversibly for future generations in the name of
national competitiveness.
This argument is also relevant to certain environmental costs that must be
met by the next generation. In the medium term of a generation or two,
environmental protection affects the health of our children and grandchildren
and the state of the environment that they will inherit. If we poison children
today through contaminated water or air, these children will become the
disabled workers and parents of tomorrow.
Even from a short-term perspective, the argument that the environment is
only an amenity to be traded in the search for competitiveness can lead to later
environmental damage that will in turn undermine competitiveness. Moreover,
it can result in serious equity problems. The people who bear most of the cost
of environmental harm, especially pollution, are frequently not at all the same
people who will benefit most from the fruits of growth. On the contrary, the
poor and disadvantaged often bear a disproportionate share of environmental
costs, especially where there is little social mobility, as in most developing
countries. It is they who are disproportionately exposed to toxic chemicals,
breathe dirty air, drink polluted water, and are forced by poverty to exploit
soils, forests, and other resources in an unsustainable manner. Meanwhile, the
benefits of industrialization accrue disproportionately to the wealthy. On
grounds of equity, then, environmental protection even in the short term ought
to be viewed as important to sustainable long-term competitiveness. 9
As a practical matter, however, states are likely to regard consideration of
many such intragenerational equity issues as a highly intrusive intervention into
their domestic economies, and hence as an unwarranted extension of
environmental law. International human rights law may offer an alternative
approach for addressing the concerns of those adversely affected.
II. INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARDS AS A BASIS FOR
PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVENESS
If we examine the topic of environmental regulation and competitiveness
through the temporal lens of sustainable competitiveness, international
standards play an important, albeit always limited, role. To address this issue,
it is useful to distinguish transboundary environmental externalities that affect
other countries, shared resources, or the global commons, from environmental
externalities that take place primarily within a country. In addition, it is
appropriate to focus separately on externalities at the firm level and to consider
19. See CHOOSING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
ENVIRONMENT 56-58 (1993) (discussing intragenerational equity aspects of sustainable development).
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the environmental soundness of the life cycle of the production process, from
the generation of resources to the disposal of the product.
This Part argues that international minimum standards are appropriate for
a growing number of transboundary externalities, including those affecting the
global commons, and that they may also be appropriate for certain serious
externalities within countries. In addition, firms should implement the "polluter
pays" principle as a step toward incorporating the full environmental costs of
pollution control and resource use in the life cycle of the production process.
A. Transboundary Externalities
Environmentally sustainable development has become a criterion for
evaluating all development efforts, whether in industrialized or in developing
countries.20 The approximately 850-page Agenda 21 adopted by countries at
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development" begins to
give detailed meaning to this criterion. It covers both transboundary and
domestic externalities that have implications for environmentally sustainable
development. The next step is for countries to formulate performance criteria,
to assess both the state of the environment and the effectiveness of efforts to
carry out the obligations in Agenda 21.
The previous discussion on the intergenerational dimension of
competitiveness distinguished three temporal categories of environmental harm:
long-term damage which is irreversible, or reversible at unacceptable cost;
medium-term damage that affects our children and grandchildren or the
ecosystem in ways that cannot be corrected with acceptable costs; and
potentially short-term damage that can be contained with acceptable costs.
Sustainable competitiveness requires that we develop international standards
directed to the first two of these categories.
First, governments are increasingly negotiating international ambient,
process, procedural, and product standards, which promote sustainable
development. 22  The international environmental issues range from
transboundary pollution,23 to inherently global problems such as ozone
20. States confirmed this at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in June
1992. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, June 14, 1992, UNCED Doe. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992); OUR
COMMON FUTURE, supra note 1 (prepared in anticipation of Rio conference).
21. See Agenda Item 21, supra note 1.
22. For an overview of developments in international environmental law, see Edith Brown Weiss,
International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81
GEO. L.J. 675 (1993).
23. See Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the
Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes, Nov. 18, 1991, 31
I.L.M. 573 [hereinafter LRTAP VOC Protocol]; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, Oct. 31, 1988, art. 2, cl. 1, 28 I.L.M. 212, 216, (entered into force 1991)
[hereinafter Sofia Protocol]; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent, July 8,
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depletion24 and climate change,25 to conservation of resources within
national borders such as biological diversity,26 forests,27 and soils, 28 to
movements of products and of fauna and flora.29
In the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, for
example, countries have agreed to phase out certain chemicals and to reduce
consumption of others by given dates.30 The general policy objective is that
the ozone layer not be depleted by human-made chemicals. The obligation to
phase out certain chemicals by given dates represents an international time-
dependent standard which implements the general policy. States in turn adopt
national standards to implement the international chemical reduction standards,
but they are free to adopt whatever approaches they find most suitable-such
as bans, tax incentives, and tradeable permits. Nations are also free to adopt
measures that would phase out the chemicals faster than required by the
agreement and to phase out chemicals not even covered by the agreement.3'
Other international agreements establish procedural duties or standards
which are intended to ensure sustainability. The recently concluded agreement
on environmental impact assessment (EIA) under the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (ECE),32 for example, sets forth details on when
EIA's are required and what information must be included in them. Similarly,
the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on Climate Change
set forth parties' procedural obligations, such as to prepare national inventories
of greenhouse emissions33 or national biological diversity conservation
plans,34 which are intended to lead to planetary sustainability. In the latter
1985, art. 2, 27 I.L.M. 707, 708 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Helsinki Protocol].
24. See Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537; Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.
16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan.
1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL. Pro.4/15 (1992).
25. See Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter Climate
Change Convention].
26. See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter Biological
Diversity Convention].
27. See Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, June 13, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 881 [hereinafter Forest
Principles].
28. See U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, World Soil Charter, Nov. 25, 1981, 21 FAt Conf.
Res. 8/81, reprinted in EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND REFERENCES 456 (1992).
29. See, e.g., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar.
3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 12 I.L.M. 1088.
30. Montreal Protocol, supra note 24, arts. 2 & 5, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, at 2-4, 6, 26 I.L.M. at
1552-54, 1555-56.
31. Id., art. 2, para. 11, S. TREATY DOC. No. 10, at 4, 26 I.L.M. at 1554.
32. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 800 (1991).
33. Climate Change Convention, supra note 25, art. 4, 31 I.L.M. at 855.
34. Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 26, art. 6, 31 I.L.M. at 825:
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two agreements, at least, states have wide flexibility in the methods they use
to implement the agreement.
Recent developments in controlling air pollution under the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE) explore both performance- and
technology-based process standards. The new UN ECE Protocol on volatile
organic compounds, for example, obligates countries to apply emissions
standards based on best-available technologies that are economically feasible
for stationary and mobile sources, which is a technology-based process
standard.35 The Protocol also obligates countries to reduce emissions by at
least 30% of 1988 levels by the year 1999,36 which is a performance
standard.37 Negotiations are underway to revise the earlier protocol on sulfur
dioxide emissions,38 which provides simply for a 30% reduction in emissions
or transboundary fluxes, to provide for more detailed obligations.3 9 Ultimately,
parties may seek to limit emissions to critical load levels, or threshold levels
below which the pollutants pose no danger,0 which would specify a single
performance standard and provide flexibility in modes of implementation.
Stewart favors "harmonizing" international environmental standards that
address transboundary externalities as in the climate change and ozone
depletion conventions, but argues that reaching international agreements for
environmental protection is a slow and tortuous process. 4' The record in the
last twenty years indicates, to the contrary, that the international community
has become very skilled at negotiating international environmental agreements.
At the time of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
1972, there were only about three dozen multilateral environmental agreements.
In 1992, there were about 900 international legal instruments concerned with
the environment, including important nonbinding instruments.42 Within the last
two-and-a-half years, there have been a dozen roughly contemporaneous
negotiations of international environmental legal instruments.43 Countries now
routinely negotiate complicated agreements, such as the Climate Framework
Convention,"n the Environmental Protocol (with its four annexes) to the
35. LRTAP VOC Protocol, supra note 23, art. 2, para. 3, 31 I.L.M. at 575.
36. The Protocol provides that countries can choose a different year for the baseline, so long as the
annual level chosen falls between the years 1984 to 1990. Id. art. 2, para. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 575.
37. Id. For analysis of the convention, see David P. Novello, Introductory Note, 31 I.L.M. 568 (1992).
38. Helsinki Protocol, supra note 23.
39. Id. art. 2, 27 I.L.M. at 708 (providing that "the parties shall reduce their national annual sulfur
emissions or their transboundary fluxes by at least 30 percent as soon as possible and at the latest by 1993,
using 1980 levels as the basis for calculation of reductions.").
40. The LRTAP VOC Protocol defines "critical levels" as "concentrations of pollutants in the
atmosphere for a specified exposure time below which direct adverse effects on receptors, such as human
beings, plants, ecosystems or materials do not occur according to present knowledge." LRTAP VOC
Protocol, supra note 23, art. 1, para. 8, 31 I.L.M. at 575.
41. Stewart, supra note 8, at 2102-2104.
42. See BROWN WEISS ET AL., supra note 28, at 8-144.
43. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 679 n. 29.
44. Climate Change Convention, supra note 25.
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Antarctic Treaty,45 and the Convention on Biological Diversity,46 in less
than two years. Moreover, the agreements contain increasingly detailed
obligations.47 The international community has shown a surprisingly steep
learning curve in the negotiation of international environmental agreements.
The challenge now is to bring the international agreements into effect and
to ensure implementation and compliance at the national and subnational
levels. While it took less than eighteen months to negotiate the Framework
Convention on Climate, it routinely takes up to three years for agreements to
go into effect.4 In the future, it is likely that nonbinding legal instruments,49
or what some jurists call "soft law," will increase because such instruments
normally require less time to negotiate, can more easily be adapted to changes
in scientific knowledge, and do not mandate a precise fit between the
provisions in the instrument and national implementing measures. These
nonbinding legal instruments are less likely to result in precise adherence to
an international standard, but rather may lead to what the Europeans call
"mutual recognition" of countries' standards and practices, in much the same
way that the members of the European Community have moved to "mutual
recognition" of members' environmental policies.50
B. Environmental Externalities Within Countries
1. The Empirical Evidence
Almost all countries have now adopted at least one piece of environmental
legislation that controls the domestic production of environmental externalities.
45. Final Act on the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting and the Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455; Treaty Respecting the
Antarctic, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
46. Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 26.
47. Compare LRTAP VOC Protocol, supra note 23, 31 I.L.M. 573 with Helsinki Protocol, supra note
23, at 27 I.L.M. 707; compare United Nations, Commission for Europe, Draft Convention on the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1330 and Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 800 with
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972,
26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 and Convention for the Protection of world Cultural and Natural
Heritage, Nov. 13, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151.
48. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal was concluded in March 1989 but did not go into effect until May 1992, when the required
number of parties had ratified the agreement. See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 5, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991), 28 I.L.M. 657.
49. Examples include Forest Principles, supra note 27; Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, June
14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1624; London Guidelines for Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International
Trade (Amended 1989), U.N. Environmental Programme, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. UNEP GC/DEC/15/30
(1989) reprinted in BROWN WEISS El AL., supra note 28, at 644; and FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF PESTICIDES
(1986). States largely treat at least the last two of these instruments as if they were binding.
50. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Stewart is concerned that stringent environmental regulations are costly5' and
adversely affect the international competitiveness of firms in relation to
businesses located in countries with lax environmental standards. However, the
empirical evidence to date indicates that there is no need for a country to adopt
weak environmental standards, or to be lax in the enforcement of the standards
that are in place, in order to protect its international economic competitiveness.
Studies indicate that differences in environmental regulations do not necessarily
affect competitiveness, because there are many other factors in the production
process that affect the price of a product. 52 Moreover, studies indicate that the
stringency of environmental regulations does not significantly affect industrial
location decisions. 53 A World Bank study by Patrick Low and Alexander
51. For Stewart, the costs of environmental regulations impliedly often exceed the benefits, if all the
costs are considered. Stewart, supra note 8, at 2063-65. But while he carefully ferrets out the hidden costs
of environmental regulation, id. at 2063-65, 2066-67, 2068, he provides only a brief and incomplete
account of the many benefits of environmental regulation that are hard to quantify and include in a benefit-
cost analysis. Id. at 2065-66. These include the robustness of ecosystems, environmental services such as
buffering of climate and prevention of soil erosion, and diversity of fauna and flora. For an excellent report
on the variety of benefits of environmental regulation, see CENTER FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES AT MIT,
BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION, U.S. SENATE COMMITEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1980). The authors classify the benefits
of regulation into four categories: 1) lower costs of injury, disease, and aesthetic and other damage to
natural resources and ecosystems; 2) higher productivity of workers, consumers, and natural systems such
as forests, agricultural land, and wetlands; 3) development and adoption of new, more productive industrial
processes and more effective products; and 4) improvements in society, such as the formation of new
institutions or changes in income distribution. Id. at 6. The authors explore the difficulties in including all
of these benefits in benefit assessments. Id. at 11-20.
52. See, e.g., RAYMOND KOPP ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper, 1990) (comparison of controls on air and water
pollution and on hazardous waste in the U.S. and OECD countries); Section 811 of the U.S. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 requires comparative study of the competitive effects of the significant U.S. air
quality standards and those of its major trading partners. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7612 (Supp. II 1990).
53. See H. JEFFREY LEONARD, POLLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD PRODUCT 231-32
(1988). A study by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that 1-3% of the wood furniture
manufacturers in the Los Angeles area migrated to Mexico between 1988 and 1990, but only in part
because of less stringent environmental requirements. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
U.S.-MEXICO TRADE: SOME U.S. WOOD FURNITURE FIRMS RELOCATED FROM LOS ANGELES AREA TO
MExICO 3 (1991) [hereinafter GAO STUDY] (reporting that 1-3% of wood furniture manufacturers in Los
Angeles migrated to Mexico between 1988 and 1990, in part because of less stringent environmental
requirements).
In many countries the issue is not the stringency of the environmental regulations, but the pattern of
enforcement. In Mexico, for example, the environmental laws, regulations, and technical standards are in
many respects comparable to the U.S. INTERNATIONAL ACTIvITIES DIVISION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, EVALUATION OF MEXICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS: INTERIM
REPORT OF EPA FINDINGS (Nov. 22, 1991) (on file with author). For example, the U.S. and Mexico both
have primary ambient standards based on health that are comparable and cover the same pollutants,
although only the U.S. has welfare-based secondary standards. Id. at 20. Similarly both have programs
covering point source water pollution, which use technology-based requirements. Id. at 32. But until 1989
there was minimal enforcement of environmental laws in Mexico. See id. at iii & 12. Particularly since the
beginning of 1991, the Mexican government has made significant efforts to enforce its standards on both
new and existing sources and to publicize these efforts in an attempt to induce voluntary compliance by
firms. Id. at 12-13, 48. Thus, if competitive advantage has arisen from differences in environmental
standards, it has arisen primarily from differences in enforcement, not from the structure and content of the
standards. But there is scant empirical evidence that U.S. industries have migrated to Mexico to take
advantage of lax enforcement. See GAO STUDY, supra.
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Yeats discerns a global dispersion of investments in dirty industries which is
faster than that for clean industries, but the study concludes that this "is
unlikely to be adequately explained by environmental policy."'54
In surveying the literature, Judith Dean concludes more broadly that
[m]ore stringent regulations in one country are thought to result in
loss of competitiveness, and perhaps industrial flight and the
development of pollution havens. The many empirical studies which
have attempted to test these hypotheses have shown no evidence to
support them. There may be room here for better estimates of actual
environmental costs incurred by firms, and estimates by industry of
actual losses in output due to these costs. It is doubtful that this would
yield a significant impact on trade patterns.5
Stewart acknowledges these and other studies but distrusts them for
reasons he sets forth at length. He concludes that since many people argue that
"U.S. industry is suffering as a result of disparities between relatively stringent
U.S. regulatory standards and those of many of U.S. trading partners," it must
be assumed to be so, unless empirical studies conclusively demonstrate
otherwise. 6 This is an odd conclusion, for while doubts about the studies
might cause Stewart to hesitate in accepting the proposition conclusively, such
doubts by no means establish the opposite conclusion, particularly when there
is a dearth of empirical evidence to support it. Stewart's analysis should lead
him to be agnostic on the subject.
Since Stewart doubts the validity of studies that find no competitive effects
from differences in national environmental regulations, it might follow that he
would favor harmonizing standards in pursuit of a precautionary posture. But
he reserves "harmonization" only for cases of transboundary externalities, and
instead turns to voluntary contracts between governmental authorities and
industries and to market-based incentives as a means to reduce the costs of
environmental protection within countries. 7
Determining compliance levels is always difficult, in part because responsibility for enforcement
normally is placed at multiple levels-national, regional, state, and local. For a comprehensive report on
enforcement activities at several levels, see OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORTFY 1991 (Apr. 1992). In some countries,
information on compliance tends to be scattered, incomplete, or otherwise difficult to obtain. At best,
central reports may be available, but even then there may be considerable variation in the information
provided about compliance by political subunits. This makes it difficult to determine the effects of the
actual level of enforcement of environmental standards on competitiveness.
54. Patrick Low & Alexander Yeats, Do "Dirty" Industries Migrate?, in WORLD BANK PAPERS, supra
note 17, at 89, 103.
55. Judith M. Dean, Trade and The Environment: A Survey of the Literature, in WORLD BANK PAPERS,
supra note 17, at 15, 27.
56. Stewart, supra note 8, at 2085.
57. Id. at 2090-2100.
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C. The Case for International Minimum Standards
Assuming the studies are valid, if incomplete, and recognizing the potential
for Stewart's two suggested approaches, there may still be reason to develop
international standards for national externalities in certain circumstances. 8 As
indicated previously, environmentally sustainable development is a global goal
which all countries need to achieve. 9 While countries must be free to pursue
their own development paths, there may be certain minimum levels of
environmental protection and natural resource conservation which should shape
the development process. Countries may wish to adopt more stringent
environmental standards, which would be consistent with this approach. From
the perspective of sustainable competitiveness, such minimum standards help
to resolve the potential tension between competitiveness in the present and
sustainable development which can form the foundation for competitiveness in
future generations. Minimum standards also help to counter any adverse
competitive effects from differences in environmental regulation and
implementation,60 and in this sense serve a precautionary function.
The development of minimum standards is common to fields other than the
environment as a way to ensure certain performance by targeted actors. For
example, in banking, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has
developed proposed minimum standards for the supervision of international
banking groups and their cross-border units to ensure that banks are subject to
61 m
effective supervision. The minimum standards provide flexibility to
countries in applying them to take account of different legal and structural
conditions. 62
The development of international minimum standards may take several
different forms: identical standards, mutual recognition of comparable
standards, or even compatibility of standards based on the underlying
objectives. There is precedent for each. Identical standards have been
developed for procedures associated with the premanufacturing of products,
58. Conceptually, there are different kinds of standards: ambient, process, procedural, and product.
Ambient standards are standards of environmental quality in the air, water, and other media. Process
standards, including emissions standards for pollutants, govern the methods of production and the
technologies used. Procedural or technical standards concern the testing of products, the gathering and
evaluation of data, laboratory practices, etc. Product standards relate to the technical characteristics of the
product. As indicated below, see infra text accompanying notes 63-70, a minimum standard can take
different forms: identical, mutual recognition of comparable standards, and even compatibility with the
policy objective.
59. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
60. See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1250 (1992) (arguing that "it could well be feasible and worthwhile,
although time-consuming, to develop some rules in the trading system that impose certain kinds of
harmonizing minimum level standards for environmental protection").
61. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International
Banking Groups and Their Cross-Border Establishments, July 6, 1992 (available from the Federal Reserve
Bank of the United States).
62. Id.
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such as for good laboratory practices.63 The European Community is opting
for mutual recognition of standards, rather than identical standards, for many
environmental issues,64 and the North American Free Trade Agreement
provides for compatibility of standards.65 International minimum standards
differ from harmonized standards, in that they set only a baseline for judging
behavior and allow countries or other targeted actors to exceed the minimum.
The standards must be able to be adapted to respond to changes in scientific
knowledge. In some cases, this will lead to stricter minimum standards; in
others, such as in the recent case of dioxin,66 to less strict standards.
In the U.S., the major national environmental legislation provides that
states can adopt stricter standards than the national standard.67 This is
essential globally, for otherwise the international community would be forcing
states to accept a dirty environment against their wishes, which would be a
violation of national sovereignty and arguably of the polluting nation's duty to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control do not cause harm to
areas outside their jurisdiction or control.68 To some extent harmonization of
national pollution standards is taking place through the private sector.
Multinational companies are increasingly adopting the same environmental
standards for their plants, regardless of the country in which they operate.69
63. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has developed many test guidelines
and fostered a number of agreements concerning good laboratory practices. Member states of the OECD
have agreed to accept data from each other that is developed according to the test guidelines and good
laboratory practices. See OECD High Level Meeting on Chemicals, May 19-21, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1023, 1030
(1980).
64. Giandomenico Majone notes that, in its White Paper on the completion of the internal market, the
Commission of the European Community has proposed "a new approach to regulation which includes
among its key elements the strategy of 'mutual recognition."' Giandomenico Majone, Market Integration
and Regulation: Europe After 1992, 43 METROECONOMICA 131, 140 (1992). The White Paper has made
a conceptual distinction between "matters where harmonization is essential and those where it is sufficient
that there be mutual recognition of the equivalence of the various basic requirements laid down under
national law." Id. at 141. The concept of mutual recognition assumes that states have confidence in each
other as trading partners. See RENAUD DEHOUSEE ET AL., EUROPE AFER 1992: NEw REGULATORY
STRATEGIES (European University Institute Working Paper LAW No. 92/31, 1992) (discussing past
experience with harmonization in European Community).
65. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 906, Free Trade Law Reports, Special
Report No. 39, Extra Edition ("[T]he Parties shall, to the greatest extent practicable, make compatible their
respective standards-related measures, so as to facilitate trade in a good or service between the Parties.").
66. For case study analysis of the dioxin controversy, see Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic
Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10528, 10549-54 (1991).
67. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7505a (1988 & Supp. II 1990); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n.
v. Jorling, 152 Misc. 2d 405, 577 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1991) (holding that New York State may adopt auto
emission standards as stringent as California standards); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988);
Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1284 (D.S.D. 1979) (holding that state may condition
NPDES permit on compliance with higher state standard.)
68. See Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June
16, 1972, princ. 21, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 601 (1987).
69. See, e.g., GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 151 (1992) ("Ford Motor Company for example, states that, even where not required
by Mexican law, 'Ford environmental practices in the US are also applied at [their] Mexican Maquiladora
facilities."')
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Thus, they may be more likely to be in compliance with national
environmental laws, or even to have stricter standards, because of the
multinational company's need for efficiency of operations. 0
Intervention to promote a minimum standard is not necessarily appropriate
and may in some circumstances be counterproductive. Below, I detail three
criteria for determining when a minimum standard is appropriate: 1) whether
we have sufficient experience with different standards to be able to develop a
standard with confidence; 2) whether we will impose large costs on groups to
comply with the standard, which might as effectively be spent on alternative
approaches to the same end; and 3) whether we will mandate a choice of risk
priorities for short-term harm rather than leaving it to the states to determine.
1. The Need for Experimentation
Communities are still experimenting with the best techniques for
preventing and controlling pollution. The U.S. has moved from relying on
common-law litigation to a mix of regulatory standards, including ambient
standards, emissions limitations, and technology-based controls, and recently
to market mechanisms.7 Similarly, countries have moved from focusing only
on conserving particular species to protecting habitats.72 It may be premature
in these circumstances to attempt to develop minimum international standards
based on particular national environmental regulations among countries. While
it would be possible to formulate minimum pollution control standards among
countries in some cases, these standards must be flexible enough to
accommodate both those who wish to adopt stricter standards and new
scientific evidence which suggests there is no longer a need for a given
standard.
2. The Need for Alternative Approaches
In some cases, large costs may be imposed on groups unnecessarily by
certain forms of international minimum standards, unless we recognize that
differences in local geographical conditions and social preferences may
sometimes make alternative approaches to environmental control desirable.
Different physical conditions-altitude, soil composition, rainfall patterns,
70. It is a separate question, however, whether individual plants actually implement these standards,
and more importantly, whether the parent company actually sees to it that they are put into practice and
maintained. In developing countries, with scarce resources to devote to enforcement, the companies that
initially demonstrate standards higher than the national one may not be targeted for frequent enforcement
visits.
71. See, e.g., U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (Supp. II 1990).
72. For details, see Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 679, 690-91 (1993).
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species distribution-and different infrastructures may also run counter to the
formulation of certain kinds of minimum standards.73
3. The Need to Prioritize Risks
All countries need to prioritize their environmental risks. Certain
environmental risks occur mainly at the national and subnational levels, and
have only marginal international effects, whether on the environment or on
economic competition. These may include, for example, noise pollution,
pollution of specific ground water aquifers, and certain kinds of air and surface
water pollution. In these instances there may be little reason to try to establish
international minimum standards, unless there are particular groups or
ecosystems of interest to the international community that are suffering
particularized damage.
D. Nongovernmental Sources of Minimum Standards
While governments are perceived as the usual route for developing
international minimum standards, there are also other important sources,
including corporations, industrial associations, and professional societies.
Because of the rapid advance in and dissemination of new technologies,
common environmentally sound practices may emerge within industries.
Informal discussions with industry representatives have suggested that as
companies become global operators, they are driven for reasons of economic
efficiency to adopt relatively comparable standards among themselves.7'
Industrial associations and other nongovernmental fora are also increasingly
developing common environmental guidelines for particular industries or for
particular operations.75 While these are usually quite general in character, they
do contribute to the emergence of a minimum standard of environmentally
responsible behavior. Finally, professional societies also engage in setting
common international environmental standards. For example, when molecular
biologists became concerned about the risk of environmental damage from
DNA research, they issued research guidelines, which they later modified in
73. For example, in the U.S., particulates are ambient air pollutants that are regulated by State
Implementation Plans, which differ among states and allow for variation at the local level to accommodate
local concerns and needs. See U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (Supp.
I1 1990).
74. Informal discussions at the MIT Symposium on Global Environmental Accords, September 24,
1992.
75. See, e.g., LEONARD, supra note 53, at 80 & n.72 (discussing role of International Chamber of
Commerce in setting environmental guidelines for world industry); Alfred Louis Amato, Current
Developments-The Valdez Principles: A Corporate Self-Governance Code on Environmental Conduct, 2
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 237 (1989) (discussing Valdez Principles, a ten point standard for evaluating
corporate activities affecting environment, drafted by Coalition for Environmentally Responsible
Economies).
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response to new risk assessments that indicated that the dangers were not as
serious as they had thought.76 These guidelines of the scientists subsequently
formed the basis of governmental regulations.
In such cases, efforts by governments to formalize minimum standards
may be unnecessary,77 or even counterproductive depending upon what form
the standard takes. In order for this phenomenon to result in effective
environmental protection, however, the market needs to account for the full
environmental costs that it does not yet reflect, such as those to future
generations.
E. Sustainable Competitiveness in the Life Cycle of the Production Process
Stewart does not distinguish between the competitiveness of nations and
the competitiveness of firms. Many of his arguments, such as the need for
international harmonization of environmental standards on greenhouse gas
emissions, conservation of biological diversity, transboundary movements of
hazardous wastes, ozone depletion and endangered species7" are addressed to
protecting national competitiveness and not the competitiveness of firms. Other
arguments, such as the burden on U.S. firms of national environmental
regulations, are addressed to the international competitiveness of these firms.
But the distinction is crucial, for the factors that affect competitiveness in the
two situations are different.
79
At the firm level, sustainable competitiveness draws attention to the
environmental soundness of the whole life cycle of the production process.
Processes of resource extraction and use, of production, and of product
disposal are all relevant. Trade competitiveness will be increasingly based on
the competitiveness of the life cycle of the production process, just as
environmental sustainability rests in important part on the soundness of the life
cycle of the production process for the environment.
The international community has long been concerned with the
externalities firms impose on the environment. In 1974, the member countries
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
adopted the polluter pays principle, which provides that "the polluter should
bear the expenses of carrying out the measures [necessary] to ensure that the
environment is in an acceptable state."80 Command-and-control regulations
76. Compare Genetics: Conference Sets Strict Controls to Replace Moratorium, 187 SCIENCE 931
(Mar. 14, 1975), with Warren E. Leary, U.S. Set to Relax Guidelines for Gene-Splitting Research, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 1978, at Cl.
77. See GORE, supra note 7, at 192-95 (1992) (discussing creative responses of industry to
environmental pollution).
78. Stewart, supra note 8, at 2099-2100.
79. See supra note 5 (discussing "national competitiveness").
80. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Council Recommendation on the
Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, Nov. 14, 1974, OECD Doc. C(74)223, 14 I.L.M. 234 (1975).
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or economic incentives that promote implementation of the polluter pays
principle promote environmentally sustainable development, insofar as they
force firms to internalize the costs of environmental externalities.
III. MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES AS A PROMISING BUT UNTESTED
APPROACH TO SUSTAINABLE NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
While nations use a variety of instruments to protect the environment,
command-and-control regulations are arguably the most widespread. Ernst
Ulrich von Weiziicker?' and others have argued that command-and-control
regulation is a highly inefficient and burdensome method of environmental
protection, and that economic instruments such as taxes would be superior.
Whatever the merits of the argument for taxes, command-and-control
regulations have changed behavior. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann notes that "[t]he
theory of public choice teaches that political choices among alternative policy
instruments may be determined more by the self-interests of organized groups
and of politicians than by the economic objective of maximizing national
economic welfare through efficient policy instruments. ' 2 He concludes that
those who produce pollution and those who are concerned with labor,
environmental protection, and exports may prefer command-and-control
regulations to other economic instruments. 3 Stewart argues that the
administrative costs of command-and-control regulations are so burdensome
that they affect competitiveness, at least in the U.S., and pleads for market-
based incentives to implement environmental policies.'
The economic instruments discussed by Professor Stewart promise
important advantages in that they should create incentives for industry to
develop and apply innovative, lower-cost measures to minimize environmental
degradation. One of the instruments that he focuses on is transferable pollution
permits.85 As of this writing, transferable permits are promising but still
essentially untried. While they are attractive because they can, in principle,
minimize administrative costs, they are not free of such costs. In addition, they
require certain conditions to be effective: easy access by participants to good
information about the emissions credit market, physical models of the
environment that make emissions permits easy to calculate reliably, a
regulatory process that can approve or register applications quickly, effective
means of monitoring compliance with emissions permits, and a reliable system
81. Ernst Ulrich von Weizkeker, Regulatory Reform and The Environment: The Cause for
Environmental Taxes, in DEREGULATION OR RE-REGULATION? REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES 198, 201-206 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990).
82. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy, Environmental Policy and the GA2T: Why Trade Rules
and Environmental Rules Should be Mutually Consistent, 46 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFr 197, 206 (1991).
83. Id.
84. Stewart, supra note 8, at 2087-90, 2093-97.
85. Id. at 2094-97, 2104-05.
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for monitoring emissions levels, especially in geographical areas where
elevated levels may pose health and other environmental risks.86
Tradeable pollution permits address the question of efficiency of
environmental regulation. They do not address the question of equity. The
basis for allocating emissions permits can be highly controversial, particularly
if the scheme were to be applied between countries. Moreover, once the initial
market allocations have been made, it may be politically difficult for the
government to decrease overall emissions in response to new scientific
information unless the permits have been issued for a limited time period.
The U.S. first experimented with emissions trading programs in 1979,
when it allowed a plant operating under emissions limitations to increase
emissions at one point in the plant if it decreased emissions at another. This
was known as the "bubble policy," because a plant could create a theoretical
dome over itself and have only the aggregate amount of emissions from the
dome considered, rather than the emissions from the individual sources within
the dome or bubble. In 1986 the U.S. developed a more comprehensive
Emissions Trading Policy.87 This policy included three aspects: bubbling,88
netting (trade between a new source and an existing source within a plant),89
and offsetting (increases from new sources offset by reductions in other
existing sources in area).90 The Policy also permitted companies to "bank"
emission credits for later use. In 1989, Hahn and Hester found in reviewing the
limited experience with the Emissions Trading Policy that companies had used
the system only infrequently, particularly the provisions for banking and
trading emissions between firms, despite the economic benefits that the system
was designed to create.9' The study revealed that the uncertainties in
calculating baselines and in determining which reductions could be used to
establish emissions credits had created uncertainty about the property rights
created by the emissions credit system.92 Moreover, it was difficult to find
willing sellers, and no market information was available for use in anticipating
86. See Robert Hahn & Gordon Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's
Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. REG. 109, 140-41 (1989); Edith Brown Weiss & Mark Kindall,
Emissions Trading as a Mechanism for Efficient Environmental Management (1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
87. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986).
88. Air Programs, Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 40 C.F.R. § 52 (1987).
89. By using netting, a plant could be exempted from some of the preconstruction review process
requirements for new stationary sources, which can mean significant savings. Id.
90. Offsets are required in areas where ambient air quality standards are not being met or are in danger
of being exceeded. If the new source is an area where ambient standards are not being met and there is no
plan approved for attaining the ambient air quality standards, the offset must result in at least a 20%
reduction of pollution from the baseline level of emissions. Emission Offset Interpretive Ruling, 44 Fed.
Reg. 3274, 3274-76 (1979) (to be codified at 40 C.RR. § 51).
91. Hahn & Hester, supra note 86, at 118-136.
92. Id. at 140.
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the future price of credits.93 In addition, transaction costs were high in
obtaining regulatory approval for an emissions trade.94
The newest experiment with emissions trading in the U.S. is the proposed
sulfur dioxide trading system under the Clear Air Act Amendments of 1990,95
which sets up unit accounts for emissions of sulfur dioxide and allows banking
and trading of allowances between units.96 The system is designed to reduce
some of the problems encountered earlier,97 particularly through streamlined
trading procedures and reliable information on potential sources of S02
allowances. Even so, the system depends on an effective regulatory
infrastructure that can monitor emissions, determine compliance, and penalize
noncompliance. In this sense, the sulfur dioxide system builds upon the last
twenty years of environmental regulation; it does not supplant it. As with any
new instrument, it will be important to monitor experience with transferable
pollution permits to be sure that they lead to effective and more efficient
environmental protection and contribute to sustainable competitiveness.
CONCLUSION
Stewart's focus is on the effect of environmental regulations on
competitiveness today, and to a lesser extent, in the past. But it is essential to
extend our focus forward, to the future, to sustainable competitiveness, which
is inherently intergenerational. If we adopt this lens, then the treatment of the
environment today becomes the basis upon which future production rests.
93. Id.
94. The authors note that "the federal-approved process for bubbles is much more costly and lengthy
than for many state-approved emissions trading activities, thereby creating a great incentive for firms to
use forms of emissions trading under state control-generic bubble, netting, and offsets." Id. at 140-41.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (Supp. II 1990).
96. Section 403(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a), requires the Environmental Protection Agency
to allocate SO 2 emission allowances for each unit covered by the statute in an amount equal to the statutory
SO 2 emission limits, provided that no more than 8.95 million allowances are allocated annually after
January 1, 2000. Section 403(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b), authorizes the transfer of these
allowances between units. Under the proposed rules, for every affected unit, EPA will establish SO2
emission allowance accounts, which will be divided into 30 subaccounts for the current year and each
subsequent year for thirty years. At the end of every year, the subaccount for that year is closed and a new
subaccount opened for the 30th year from the current year. A unit may keep these allowances in each
subaccount or may trade them in advance. If a unit has unused emission allowances at the end of the
subaccount period, they are "banked" into the next year's account and available for use or for trading with
other units. The EPA has proposed that industries make transfers by submitting a request to record the
transfer of allowances, with each allowance having its own tracking number. All information in the
Allowance Tracking System would be publicly available, eventually through a system that permits
electronic access to the data. Efforts already underway at the Chicago Board of Trade and other exchanges
could lead to the development of allowance-based financial exchanges that would service futures and spot
markets for emissions allowances. See Acid Rain Allowance Allocation and Reserves, 40 C.F.R. §§ 72, 73,
75 (1993) (finalizing regulations proposed July 7, 1992, establishing SO 2 allowance reserves and the Special
Allowance Reserve for EPA auctions and sales of allowances); Brown Weiss & Kindall, supra note 86.
97. See Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?
13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217 (1988).
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In the context of nations, sustainable competitiveness requires the present
generation to internalize both present and future costs of production and to
develop minimum standards of environmental protection, especially for
transboundary externalities. At the firm level, it requires attention to the full
life cycle of the production process and implementation of the polluter pays
principle. Whatever instruments we may develop to make the protection of the
environment more efficient must be critically reviewed to ensure that they will
in practice protect the interests of future generations as well as ourselves in
environmentally sustainable development-and in sustainable competitiveness.
